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Abstract: An understanding of the house price to rent ratio and its determinants is important in 
assessing housing market developments and tenure choice therein. While the ratio is most 
usually explained by the user cost of capital, the influence of credit conditions on it has been 
added to econometric assessments in recent years. Using a new cross-country panel, we 
estimate the impact of variations in credit conditions on the house price to rent ratio between 
1994 and 2015 on both a panel and country-by-country basis. This period was one of 
substantial cross-country house price movements as developments in standard explanatory 
variables, such as income levels, interest rates and demographics, were accompanied by major 
changes in credit markets. In line with other recent studies, our results establish the relevance 
of credit conditions to the house price to rent ratio at both panel and country levels. Moreover, 
the evidence points to credit conditions dominating the user cost of capital over the sample 
period, emphasising the need to include credit analysis when evaluating housing market 
developments.
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11. Introduction
One of the main indicators used to assess the stability of housing markets is the house
price to rent ratio. Typically this ratio assumes that in the absence of frictions and credit
restrictions, arbitrage between owner-occupied and rental housing ensures that the
house price to rent ratio is a function of the real user cost of capital. However, mainly
in light of the liberalisation of financial markets over recent years, a number of appli-
cations (Kim (2007), Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy (2011) and Cronin and McQuinn
(2016)) have identified credit conditions as a wedge in the user cost / price-rent rela-
tionship and have augmented the standard relationship accordingly.
This development has a number of important implications. Under the standard
relationship, changes in the equilibrium relationship between house prices and rents
can only occur due to changes in interest rates, agents’ expectations concerning house
prices, and items such as the natural depreciation rate and relevant taxation rates. Un-
der the augmented relationship, however, credit conditions can also cause movements
in the house price to rent ratio. This reflects the impact changing credit conditions can
have on tenure choice in a particular property market: all other things being equal,
changes in the provision of credit affect households’ preferences between renting and
owner-occupying a property. The incorporation of credit conditions into the determi-
nation of the house price to rent ratio also reflects the period 1994 to 2015, which is that
studied here, being one of substantial changes in credit provision across many OECD
countries. For a variety of reasons, financial institutions across different countries were
able to increase their lending to the real economy, although there was considerable
variation, with some countries’ financial sectors experiencing more rapid growth vis-a´-
vis GDP than others.1
In this paper, we conduct a detailed assessment of the determinants of the house
price to rent ratio for 15 OECD countries using a newly constructed quarterly dataset
over the period 1994 to 2015. Initially, we examine the impact of the user cost of capital
and credit conditions on the ratio in a panel data context with the results indicating a
long-run relationship arising between the three variables across countries over the pe-
riod. However, given the heterogeneity observed in the rates of loan extension across
1See McCarthy and McQuinn (2017), for example, for a detailed examination of changes in the Irish
financial sector - a sector which saw one of most significant increases in the period up to 2007.
2different credit markets, we also examine the relationship on a country-by-country ba-
sis.
The econometric estimations have some salient features. First, credit conditions
have a significant impact on the house price to rent ratio over the entire period. For
most of the fifteen countries, the impact of credit conditions initially increased sub-
stantially during the earlier part of the house price boom that arose between 1995 and
2007, contained within the sample, before declining somewhat thereafter. For the pe-
riod when house prices were increasing (pre-2007), it is evident from the results that
credit availability dominates the user cost of capital in terms of the magnitude and sig-
nificance of its impact. Secondly, parameter stability tests reveal that the adoption of
the euro in 1999 and the international financial crash of 2007/08 are particularly in-
fluential in the relationship between the price to rent ratio, the user cost of capital,
and credit availability for a number of countries. These results, arising at the aggre-
gate level, mimic the results from the use of microeconomic data (Chiuri and Jappelli
(2003), Bic˘a´kova´ and Sierminska (2007), Trucchi (2016) and Acolin, Bricker, Calem and
Wachter (2016) for example), which demonstrate the importance of credit conditions
in affecting tenure choice decisions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we first present the stan-
dard model of the house price to rent ratio and how it is augmented to include credit
conditions. The data used are also outlined. The following section then presents the
cross-country analysis with panel unit root tests and cointegration procedures being
applied to the panel data. Section 4 reports the results of econometric estimations
conducted at the individual country level. The implications of the results, including
for macroprudential policy, are considered in the concluding section.
2. Econometric approach and data
2.1. Econometric model
The standard approach to the determination of the house price to rent approach as-
sumes that, in the absence of credit restrictions, arbitrage between owner-occupied
and rental housing ensures that the house price to rent ratio depends on the real user
cost of capital, i.e.
3hpt/rentt = (rt + σt + tt −4hpet/hpt). (1)
where hp is house prices, rent is actual rental rates, t relates to any property taxes to
which the homeowner is liable, r is the real interest rate, σ is the natural rate of depre-
ciation of the house and hpe is expected house prices. We label the right hand side of (1)
as RUSERt, the real user cost of capital:
hpt/rentt = RUSERt. (2)
Variants of this framework applied to housing markets can be found in Blackey and
Follain (1995), Himmelberg et al (2005), Murphy (2005), Campbell, Davis, Gallin and
Martin (2006), Gallin (2008), Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2012) and Browne, Conefrey and
Kennedy (2013).
The presence of mortgage market imperfections such as credit rationing, however,
lead Kim (2007) to identify a wedge in the user cost / price-rent arbitrage relationship.
Kim (2007) demonstrates that the equilibrium price to rent ratio can be affected by
binding, credit constraints as well as the real user cost of capital. Thus, to reflect such
frictions, (2), is augmented in the following manner:
(hpt/rentt) = f [RUSERt, CREDt]. (3)
Cronin and McQuinn (2016) estimate (3) with Irish data and find that restrictions
on credit availability have a significant long-run impact on the ratio of house prices
to rents in the Irish market. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients in the
Cronin and McQuinn (2016) application are broadly in line with the comparable results
in Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy (2011) in a US context.
In this paper we estimate equation (3) initially for a cross-country sample of 15
OECD countries over the period 1994Q4 to 2015Q1 before doing so also at an individual
country level.
42.2. Data
Quarterly data for 15 OECD countries are used in the paper. The dataset is new in
that it combines cross-country data on housing and mortgage markets from a num-
ber of different sources. The countries are Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), the
United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada (CA), Spain (ES), Australia (AU),
the Netherlands (NE), Sweden (SW), Denmark (DK), Norway (NO), Finland (FI), New
Zealand (NZ) and Ireland (IE), while the time period is 1994:Q4 to 2015:Q1. Three main
sources of data are used: house price and rent data are taken from the OECD Analytical
House Price database; household credit is from the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS); quarterly GDP, interest rates and GDP deflator data are taken from the IMF’s In-
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The house price and house price to rent
data are then both expressed as an index equalling 100 in 2010, while the credit data are
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Most country level mortgage markets are characterised, in the aggregate, by a pref-
erence for either variable or fixed rate mortgages. A survey paper, ECB (2003), based on
questionnaires conducted by national central banks (NCBs), provides some informa-
tion on the nature of mortgage contracts in individual EU countries. The interest rate
adjustment in each country is characterised as being either fixed (F) or variable (V).
For an interest rate to be classified as fixed, it must be fixed for more than five years,
or until final maturity, whereas in the case of the variable rate, it is either negotiable
after one year, is tied to market rates, or is adjustable at the discretion of the lender.2
Based on these observations, each country in our sample is classified into a variable or
fixed rate category where the variable (fixed) rate mortgage rates are proxied by country
specific short-term money market rates (long-term Government bond rates). Annual
population data is taken from either a country’s national statistical agency or Euro-
Stat’s NewCronos. These series are then interpolated and along with the GDP data are
combined to arrive at a quarterly GDP per capita series for each country. The data are
summarised in Table 1.
To capture the country-specific fluctuations for some of the main variables between
1994 and 2015, we plot in Figures 1 to 3 the coefficient of variation for each country for
the price to rent ratio, nominal house prices and household credit to GDP. The coeffi-
2See Table 5.1 of ECB (2003) for more details.
5cient of variation is a standardized measure of dispersion of a probability distribution
or frequency distribution and is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean. For the period, the Irish market exhibits the largest degree of volatility for both
the price to rent and the household credit to GDP ratios. This is unsurprising as previ-
ous research has highlighted the significance and scale of the Irish housing and credit
bubble in the context of other OECD countries (Kennedy and McQuinn (2011)).
The credit variable used in the estimation of (3) is credit supplied to the households
and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs) sectors. To capture the impact
of supply-side changes on credit conditions, the actual series is first adjusted to allow
for changes in relevant demand-side variables.
The actual household credit variable is modelled as a function of demand side fac-
tors such as changes in the log of unemployment (dlU ), interest rates (r), population
levels (POP ) and household income levels (Y ). The credit variable is filtered (flcred)
to allow for long-run changes. The following specification, also estimated for the Irish
market in Kelly and McQuinn (2014), is used:
lCREDt = α0 + α1lCREDt−1+
α2flCREDt + α3dlUt + α4Yt + α5POPt + α6rt + t. (4)
In estimating (4) for each country, we adopt the Hendry (1993) general-to-specific
approach and only leave in the variables which are significant. The fitted series is
similar to the indicator of credit conditions estimated by Fernandez-Corugedo and
Muellbauer (2006) for the UK market and the mortgage market conditions index es-
timated for the Irish market by McCarthy and McQuinn (2017). The resulting adjusted
CRED (ACREDt) is calculated in the same manner as in Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy
(2011). This is estimated on a single-equation basis for each country in our sample.
To estimate an expression for the real user cost (RUSERt), we compile an expected
house price appreciation term. Following Duca, Muellbauer and Murphy (2011), we
use a four period moving average of this term here.3
3Kelly and McQuinn (2014) examine alternative possible price expectations mechanisms such as a
naı¨ve expectations approach and following Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) and Duca, Muellbauer,
and Murphy (2011) lagged house price appreciation over the prior four years. However, the overall results
were not sensitive to the alternative specifications.
63. Panel Unit Root Tests and Cointegration Results
In Table 2 we present the results of a number of panel data unit root tests for the three
variables of interest: the house price to rent ratio (hpt/rentt), the real user cost of capital
(RUSERt) and the adjusted credit variable (ACREDt). In particular we apply the Im,
Pesaran, and Shin (2003), Breitung (2000) and Hadri (2000) tests. The Im Pesaran and
Shin (2003) test computes separate ADF test statistics on each individual country series
and combines those by the simple averaging of the t-statistics across all 15 countries.
The Im Pesaran and Shin (2003) test statistic used is a normalized and rescaled version
of this called Zt˜−bar which has an asymptotic N(0, 1) distribution. The Hadri (2000) test
is unlike the other two in that the null hypothesis is stationarity. Based on the statistics
reported in Table 2, we cannot reject the null of a unit root (Im Pesaran and Shin (2003)
and Breitung (2000)) and can reject the null of stationarity (Hadri(2000)) for all three
variables.
Given these results, we next estimate a panel model version of equation (3). We test
for cointegration within a panel-data context using the Pedroni (1999) single equation
framework. These tests are all single-equation methods based on estimating the static
cointegrating regression of the following form:
yit = αi + δut+ βixit + it i = 1, 2.., N ; t = 1, 2.., T (5)
where x is a vector of regressors and β consists of its associated parameters. The tests
are constructed by using the residuals ˆit from the above cointegrating regression.
The cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni are sufficiently flexible so as to en-
able the investigation of heterogeneous panels, in which heterogeneous slope coef-
ficients, fixed effects and individual specific deterministic trends are permitted. Pe-
droni proposes a number of panel cointegration statistics. Some of these statistics,
called panel cointegration statistics, are based on within-country based statistics, while
the other statistics, called group mean panel cointegration tests, are between-country
panel statistics.
The standardized statistics tend in distribution to the normal density under the null
hypothesis of no cointegration. Pedroni (1999) tabulates the required moments for the
standardization by simulation, for different specifications of deterministics included
7in the models. The cointegration test results are presented in Table 3. Inspection of
the critical values indicates that the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the
variables can be rejected across the different tests.
Based on these tests, we next estimate long-run models of (3) using OLS, fixed ef-
fects, random effects and the panel fully modified (FM-OLS) estimator with dummy
variables included for the individual countries. The FM-OLS estimator can be distin-
guished between three different forms of estimator depending on the way the data
are pooled: estimators that pool information along the between-dimension (Pedroni
(2004)); estimators that pool information along the within-dimension weighting all the
variables by their long run covariances (Pedroni (2004) and Kao and Chiang (2000));
and within-estimators that do not scale the variables (Mark and Sul (2003) and Pedroni
(2004)). The group mean FM-OLS estimator can be obtained as:
ψˆGFM =
∑N
i=1 ψˆFM,i
N
where ψFM,i is the FM-OLS estimator applied to the ith member of the panel. An
important advantage of this estimator is that the manner in which the data are pooled
allows for greater flexibility in the presence of heterogenity of the cointegrating vector.
Point estimates for the between-dimension estimator can be interpreted as the mean
values for the cointegrating vectors.
The results for the different estimators are presented in Table 4. There is a clear
difference between the OLS estimates and the panel data estimators, with the latter
set of results suggesting a stronger influence of credit conditions. The F-test, which
is for the null hypothesis that country specific dummies are insignificantly different
from 0, indicates that panel estimators are more appropriate given the apparent cross-
country heterogeneity in the sample. The results for the different panel data estimators,
in terms of the scale of the coefficients, are very similar. As the credit variable and the
house price to rent ratio are in log format, the panel estimates suggest that a one per
cent increase in the supply of credit causes a one per cent increase in the house price
to rent ratio for the period.4
4With satisfactory long run relationships being established in the data, we also estimate short-run dy-
namic regressions where the change in the house price-to-rent ratio is the left-hand side variable. The
results suggest the presence of error-correction. The results are available, upon request, from the authors.
84. Country-By-Country Results
The period 1994 to 2015 saw significant changes in the degree of credit extension across
different OECD countries. A substantial literature has sought to characterise develop-
ments across banking sectors, mainly in the US and European Union. A non-exhaustive
set of such studies includes Borio and Disyatat (2011), Bernanke et al. (2011), Shin
(2012), Bruno and Shin (2012a), Bruno and Shin (2012b), Obsfeld (2012), and Gourin-
chas (2012), which each examine the origination and propagation of gross capital flows
and credit boom conditions in certain advanced economies during this timeframe.
Notwithstanding the general increase in bank lending over this period, it is also ev-
ident that significant differences emerged between countries in the rate of credit ex-
pansion that each was undertaking. For example, as noted in European Systemic Risk
Board (2014), a widening gap emerged between the European Union and the United
States from the 1980s onwards in terms of the ratio of bank loans to GDP, as European
global banks, in particular, availed of the expansion in derivatives and foreign lending.
However, even within the EU, differences in the pace of credit expansion across mar-
kets arose: certain EU countries experienced only modest increases in credit to GDP
(FI, DE, and FR ) while other countries (IE, ES and PT) saw substantial increases in the
same ratio. These differences within the EU have been attributed to capital flows from
“core” euro area countries to the “periphery’, with credit flowing into, for example, ES
and IE funding housing and consumption booms in those countries in the period up to
2007.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the panel regression results in the previous section
establishing the relevance of credit conditions to the determination of the house price-
to-rent ratio, the heterogeneity of credit market developments over the 1994-2015 pe-
riod suggest that it would be informative to estimate equation (3) on a country-by-
country basis. In this section we examine the changing nature of the relationship be-
tween the house price-to-rent ratio, the user cost of capital and credit conditions for
each country within the panel.
Following on Table 4, the relevant coefficients in that table were re-estimated on a
country-by-country basis, by OLS for the entire 1994Q4 - 2015Q1 sample. The coeffi-
cients on RUSER and ACRED are shown in the two panels of Figure 4. There is some
9divergence from the results in Table 4. In particular, only for FR, SW, NO and CA does
the coefficient on RUSER have the hypothesised negative sign. For the remaining coun-
tries, the coefficient is either insignificant in value (US, IT, ES, NE, FI, IE, DK, AU, NZ) or
has a positive value (UK, DE). The coefficients on the other regressor, ACRED, however,
are in fourteen of the fifteen cases of the hypothesised positive sign and are usually
highly significant. The exception is DE where a negative coefficient is reported.
The full-sample OLS estimates of Figure 4 are complemented by the leverage mea-
sures contained in Figure 5. Across the 82 quarterly observations for each country, the
leverage measure distingushes data points on the basis of their influence in the esti-
mation of the parameter values over the full sample. The higher the leverage value,
the greater the influence of the data from that quarter. The leverage measure, thus,
provides information on what could be important developments during the sample
period. A number of different features stand out in Figure 5. One is that the quarters
around 1999 were particularly influential for the some of the euro area member states
(IT, ES, NE, FI). Those are also influential quarters for two of the other European coun-
tries (NO, DK). The main economic event around that time was the onset of EMU and
the single currency. For some of these countries the single currency brought the attrac-
tion of low and stable interest rates, while it also led to some of the changes in financial
markets which enabled greater levels of cross-border lending to occur. More influential
observations also tend to occur earlier in the sample for the other European countries
(DE, FR, UK, IE, SW).
Particularly influential observations do not arise before the mid-2000s for the US,
UK, CA, AU and NZ, while influential, observations arise in the second half of that
decade for IE and SW also. For some of these countries, the relevance of the obser-
vations around this period is most likely related to the credit-fuelled housing bubbles
which had emerged during the 2000s. The period around the financial crisis of 2008 and
2009 then seems to contain influential observations for those countries (that around
the introduction of the euro had little influence on their full sample estimates). Those,
and later quarters, are not quarters that are influential for the euro area and Northern
European countries, with the exception of IE and SW and, to a lesser extent, DE and FR.
IE, in particular, experienced a substantial correction in its financial sector post 2007
with both lending and house prices falling sharply due to the presence of overvaluation
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in the Irish property market.
With such variation in the influence of observations over the period and between
countries, an obvious extension to the modelling is to examine for changes in coeffi-
cient values over time across countries. Equation (3) was then estimated on a recursive
basis. For each country, the coefficient values for RUSER are shown in the left-hand-
side column of Figure 6, while those of ACRED are on the right-hand-side. The first es-
timate from the recursive estimation shown in each chart is for 1998Q4. The behaviour
of RUSER across the countries is relatively uneventful, with the coefficient most usu-
ally keeping its sign and significance/insignificance as the window length is extended
forward.
The behaviour of ACRED, in the right-hand-side column, is more interesting. A
hump shape is a common feature of many of the country charts for the recursive es-
timation of this coefficient, with the coefficient initially rising and then declining. For
most countries, the ACRED coefficient reaches its largest positive value in the early-to-
mid 2000s before declining steadily thereafter. The earliest times of decline arise for
the UK (2000), NE (2001), SW (2001), and DK (2001). The remaining euro area mem-
ber states FR (2003), IE (2003), IT (2005), FI (2005) and ES (2006) start to experience
a decline in the ACRED coefficient a little later. AU’s coefficient starts a slow if steady
decline after 2004. CA’s coefficient starts to decline after 2007, while the US’s falls from
2006 onwards and then recovers. NO and NZ have no noticeable decline in coefficient
value from the mid-2000s on. In the preceding years, however, NZ’s ACRED coefficient
rises sharply. The initial rise in this coefficient’s value is shared then by all the euro area
countries, as well as by the US, the UK, SW, AU and CA (i.e. thirteen countries in total).
What the pattern of many of these estimates suggest is that the relevance of changes
in credit markets on the house price to rent ratio changed substantially over the period
1994 - 2015. To varying degrees, in the period up to 2007, changes in financial markets
led to credit playing a greater role in the evolution of the house price to rent ratio. After
that, when many of these countries experienced difficulties in their financial sectors,
the resulting deleveraging which took place caused credit conditions to have a reduced
impact on the ratio.
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5. Concluding Comments
Using a new dataset combining cross-country housing and mortgage market informa-
tion, this paper empirically examines the impact of credit, alongside the user cost of
capital, on the house price to rent ratio. Movements in this ratio, which is an impor-
tant metric in assessing the stability or otherwise of property market developments,
have until recently been examined solely using the user cost of capital as its determi-
nant. The results presented here, in the first instance, establish the relevance of both
variables to the relative movement of house prices and rental values over time. These
findings, at an aggregate, cross-country level, are in line with the literature that uses
microeconomic data, which typically finds that changes in credit markets have a sig-
nificant impact on tenure choices across markets.
The panel estimates, however, also suggest some variation in the relative impor-
tance of both variables to the house price to rent ratio depending on the econometric
methodology used. The next step undertaken then was to look at regression results for
individual countries and to assess differences between them. At the country level, the
credit variable is usually found to dominate the user cost of capital in explaining the
house price to rent ratio. Its influence is at its strongest before the credit crisis of the
late-2000s, a period when many national housing markets also experienced consider-
able disruption. The introduction of the euro coincides with observations that were
particularly influential on the house price to rent ratio for many of the European coun-
tries in the dataset, while the period of financial crisis in the late 2000s was one when
influential observations arose for the North American countries, the UK and Australia.
This finding that credit conditions can have a critical influence on housing market
variables and tenure choice is of relevance to macroprudential policy, which is becom-
ing increasingly popular as a means of tempering house price inflation and influencing
market developments more generally. Our results indicate that insofar as central banks
and regulatory authorities can control credit availability for house purchase, doing so
can have an effect on households’ tenure choice. While financial stability issues are
the primary consideration in the application of macroprudential policy, the results in
this paper emphasise that policy-makers should be aware of the broader implications
of such measures, including in the housing market.
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Table 1: Summary of Data: 1994Q4 - 2015Q1
Interest House Price to Unemployment Household Rates
Rates Prices Rent Credit to GDP Classification
Germany 3.9 97.2 108.7 8.1 63.3 F
France 4.2 74.7 82.8 9.4 42.4 F
Italy 3.9 80.8 91.2 9.4 30.9 V
US 4.4 94.7 102.6 6.0 80.3 F
GB 3.8 77.1 82.5 6.3 78.5 V
Australia 5.0 68.3 80.3 6.1 88.7 V
The Netherlands 4.1 80.8 90.3 5.4 94.5 F
Sweden 3.2 71.3 76.5 7.5 60.4 V
Norway 4.3 73.8 81.9 3.7 67.9 V
Finland 2.7 77.8 83.9 9.5 45.1 V
New Zealand 5.5 77.2 81.8 5.6 73.9 F
Ireland 2.9 88.8 98.5 8.5 72.9 V
Canada 3.0 73.8 78.9 7.6 72.9 V
Spain 3.0 69.6 81.7 16.0 60.4 V
Denmark 4.3 80.1 90.2 5.6 106.1 F
Note: Interest rates, unemployment and credit to GDP are in percentages. Price to rent and
house prices are in index form. House prices and the price to rent ratios = 100 in 2010. “F” refers
to fixed and “V” refers to variable interest rates. Entries in the first five columns are averages
over the period.
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Table 2: Panel Unit Root Test Results
Variable
Test hpt/rentt RUSERt ACREDt
Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003) ADF -1.315 -1.465 -0.195
(0.094) (0.071) (0.422)
Breitung (2000) -0.221 -0.564 -0.244
(0.413) (0.286) (0.403)
Hadri (2000) 865.31 324.41 1086.92
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: P-values are in parentheses.
Table 3: Panel Cointegration Test Results
Tests Statistic Critical Value
panel v-stat -1.53 27.01
panel rho-stat 2.34 -27.65
panel pp-stat 2.28 -43.73
group rho-stat 3.85 -53.01
group pp-stat 3.71 -82.11
Note: Panel-v is a non parametric variance ratio statistic; Panel-rho and panel-pp are analo-
gous to the nonparametric Phillips-Perron rho- and t-statistics. Group rho, is analogous to the
Phillips-Perron rho-statistic, while Group-pp is analogous to the Phillips-Perron t-statistic.
17
Table 4: House price to rent model
Dependent V ariable : l(hpt/rentt)
Estimator
Variable OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects Panel FM
Constant 4.35 1.56
(110.63) (9.24)
RUSERt -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-11.43) (-7.69) (-7.82) (-1.81)
ACREDt 0.05 0.99 0.98 1.08
(3.73) (36.66) (36.48) (26.60)
F-Test (0.000)
Note: Estimation is with quarterly data covering the period 1994Q4 to 2015Q1 and T-Stats are
in parentheses. The F-Test is for the null hypothesis that the country specific dummies are
insignificantly different from 0.
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Figure 1
Coefficient of Variation for Price to Rent Ratios: 1994:4 - 2015:1
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Figure 2
Coefficient of Variation for Nom
inal House Prices: 1994:4 - 2015:1
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Figure 3
Coefficient of Variation for Household Credit to G
DP: 1994:4 - 2015:1
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Figure 5a 
Leverage measures – country-by-country 
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Leverage measures – country-by-country 
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Figure 6a. 
Recursive regression coefficient values – country-by-country 
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Figure 6b 
Recursive regression coefficient values – country-by-country 
IT IT 
  
ES ES 
  
NE NE 
  
FI FI 
  
 
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
19
98
Q
4
19
99
Q
4
20
00
Q
4
20
01
Q
4
20
02
Q
4
20
03
Q
4
20
04
Q
4
20
05
Q
4
20
06
Q
4
20
07
Q
4
20
08
Q
4
20
09
Q
4
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
4
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
4
RUSER
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
19
98
Q
4
19
99
Q
4
20
00
Q
4
20
01
Q
4
20
02
Q
4
20
03
Q
4
20
04
Q
4
20
05
Q
4
20
06
Q
4
20
07
Q
4
20
08
Q
4
20
09
Q
4
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
4
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
4
ACRED
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
1
9
9
8
Q
4
1
9
9
9
Q
4
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
1
Q
4
2
0
0
2
Q
4
2
0
0
3
Q
4
2
0
0
4
Q
4
2
0
0
5
Q
4
2
0
0
6
Q
4
2
0
0
7
Q
4
2
0
0
8
Q
4
2
0
0
9
Q
4
2
0
1
0
Q
4
2
0
1
1
Q
4
2
0
1
2
Q
4
2
0
1
3
Q
4
2
0
1
4
Q
4
RUSER
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1
9
9
8
Q
4
1
9
9
9
Q
4
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
1
Q
4
2
0
0
2
Q
4
2
0
0
3
Q
4
2
0
0
4
Q
4
2
0
0
5
Q
4
2
0
0
6
Q
4
2
0
0
7
Q
4
2
0
0
8
Q
4
2
0
0
9
Q
4
2
0
1
0
Q
4
2
0
1
1
Q
4
2
0
1
2
Q
4
2
0
1
3
Q
4
2
0
1
4
Q
4
ACRED
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
1
9
9
8
Q
4
1
9
9
9
Q
4
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
1
Q
4
2
0
0
2
Q
4
2
0
0
3
Q
4
2
0
0
4
Q
4
2
0
0
5
Q
4
2
0
0
6
Q
4
2
0
0
7
Q
4
2
0
0
8
Q
4
2
0
0
9
Q
4
2
0
1
0
Q
4
2
0
1
1
Q
4
2
0
1
2
Q
4
2
0
1
3
Q
4
2
0
1
4
Q
4
RUSER
0
1
2
3
19
98
Q
4
19
99
Q
4
20
00
Q
4
20
01
Q
4
20
02
Q
4
20
03
Q
4
20
04
Q
4
20
05
Q
4
20
06
Q
4
20
07
Q
4
20
08
Q
4
20
09
Q
4
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
4
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
4
ACRED
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
19
98
Q
4
19
99
Q
4
20
00
Q
4
20
01
Q
4
20
02
Q
4
20
03
Q
4
20
04
Q
4
20
05
Q
4
20
06
Q
4
20
07
Q
4
20
08
Q
4
20
09
Q
4
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
4
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
4
RUSER
-2.4
-1.6
-0.8
0
0.8
1.6
19
98
Q
4
19
99
Q
4
20
00
Q
4
20
01
Q
4
20
02
Q
4
20
03
Q
4
20
04
Q
4
20
05
Q
4
20
06
Q
4
20
07
Q
4
20
08
Q
4
20
09
Q
4
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
4
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
4
ACRED
26
 
 
Figure 6c 
Recursive regression coefficient values – country-by-country 
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Figure 6d 
Recursive regression coefficient values – country-by-country 
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Note: dotted lines are 2-standard error bands 
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